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Since 11 September 2001, a number of authorities have 
provided definitions for both Homeland Security (HS) and 
Homeland Defense (HD), however, as the definitions develop, 
they provide less functional detail.  The most often asked 
question posed to professionals in the field is “what is 
the distinction between the Homeland Security mission and 
the Homeland Defense mission.”  What they are really asking 
is, in a particular scenario, “who’s in charge of the 
operation?”  “When is it law enforcement, or non-military, 
and when is it a military operation”?  Many have argued 
that the command structure between the two Services needs 
to be changed to ensure the seam between HS and HD is 
minimized.  This is a natural approach because command and 
control is possibly the most important of all operational 
functions.  The objective of this thesis is to argue that 
the Navy and Coast Guard should not establish a joint 
interagency command structure for the missions of Homeland 
Security and Homeland Defense.  They should continue to 
coordinate and support one another, when required, but they 
should not combine the two Services together into a 
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Since 11 September 2001 a number of authorities have 
provided definitions for both Homeland Security (HS) and 
Homeland Defense (HD), however, as the definitions develop, 
they provide less functional detail.  The most often asked 
question posed to professionals in the field is “what is 
the distinction between the Homeland Security mission and 
the Homeland Defense mission.”  What they are really asking 
is, in a particular scenario, “who’s in charge of the 
operation?”  “When is it law enforcement, or non-military, 
and when is it a military operation”?  
Many have argued that the command structure between 
the two Services needs to be changed to ensure the seam 
between HS and HD is minimized.  This is a natural approach 
because command and control is possibly the most important 
of all operational functions.  The idea is that by 
establishing who is in charge of the operation, the 
relationship between organizations in support of the 
operation can be defined and the span of control of the 
commander can be determined.1  But this avenue should not be 
taken until:  (1) clear HS/HD objectives can be set for 
each Service, and (2) the HS/HD objectives are not assessed 
in a bubble, all the objectives and missions that support 
the national strategies are considered.   
The lack of clear distinction between the HS and HD 
mission areas stems from the inadequate guidance provided 
to adequately address the operations of maritime Homeland 
Security (law enforcement) and maritime Homeland Defense 
                     1 Chet Helms, Operational Functions, Naval War College reading 4103A, 
Newport RI, undated, page 4 
2 
(military operation).  Without this strategic guidance it 
is difficult for the Coast Guard and Navy to establish 
clear objectives within the two mission areas.  This lack 
of clarity is then magnified in the transitional seam 
between HS and HD and the support/supported relationship 
becomes unclear.  This eventually leads the experts to 
challenge the maritime domain command and control 
structure.     
A. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to argue that the Navy 
and Coast Guard should not establish a joint interagency 
command structure for the missions of Homeland Security and 
Homeland Defense.  They should continue to coordinate and 
support one another when required, but they should not 
combine the two Services together into a permanent single 
organization.  
Presently the guidance provided does not adequately 
define the operational objectives for the missions of 
Homeland Security and Homeland Defense.  In February of 
2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission revealed the lack of 
coherent strategic guidance for homeland security and 
recommended an urgent effort to focus strategy and 
resources on the homeland.2  Without clear objectives the 
capabilities and requirements cannot be properly 
determined.  Attempting to build a command structure 
without fully understanding these areas is not recommended.  
In addition, with what little guidance there is, it appears 
that the overlap between Homeland Security and Homeland 
Defense can be best addressed with the present command 
                     2 U.S. Commission on National Security/Twenty-first Century, Road Map 
for National Security:  Imperative for Change, Phase III Report 
(Washington DC 15 February 2001), page 11 
3 
structure and relationship that has been established 
between the Coast Guard and Navy.  
Today, action at the tactical level can have strategic 
implications.  In the maritime domain there are numerous 
stakeholders: international, federal, state, local and 
private industry.  A miscue between on-scene commanders 
from differing agencies could have detrimental affects on 
the operation, with international relations, and eventually 
- with the economic sector.  
The Brookings Institute concluded that a catastrophic 
attack on the maritime industry using a nuclear device 
concealed in a shipping container could cause damage and 
disruption costing the U.S. economy as much as $1 trillion.3  
The importance of establishing an effective command and 
control structure for ensuring security in the maritime 
domain cannot be overstated.   
B. METHODOLOGY 
This paper will attempt to extrapolate what the 
objectives are for HS and HD from the current strategic 
guidances and policies.   These objectives will then be 
compared to the Services missions to identify not just 
where the overlap might exist, but also the extent of what 
these missions will be versus the other Service 
requirements.  This evaluation will then be used to compare 
the current command structure to an interagency model.    
A fundamental concept that will be applied is that 
organizations are formed to influence the environment and 
                     3 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I.M. Destler, 
David L. Gunter, Rogert E Litan, and James D. Steinberg, Protecting the 
American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis, Brookings Institute Press, 
2002 
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achieve specific outcomes.4  How well the organization’s 
outputs achieve the desired outcomes will indicate its 
effectiveness.  Imperative to an organizations ability to 
efficiently produce outputs is its command and control 
structure.   
The formation of a command structure should be built 
around the organization’s desired outcomes.  If the 
outcomes are not clearly defined then the organization will 
not know how it should influence the environment and what 
objectives it should establish.  Once you have an idea of 
the objectives and the missions then the command and 
control structure can be formulated.  This is basically 
what the Navy and Coast Guard have been trying to muddle 
through, but unfortunately they have wanted to address the 
command structure in parallel with the development of the 
objectives.  In addition, there have been some unofficial 
proposals that address the command development process in a 
vacuum, only focusing on the Homeland Security/Homeland 
Defense missions and not all Service missions.   
Unfortunately, in the review of the guidances and 
policies it became very clear that there is not a doctrinal 
standardization for how goals, capabilities, missions, and 
objectives are defined.  For this reason, a model was 
developed to help interpret between the various documents 
to determine what the requirements and objectives would be 
for the Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions 
(Figure 1).  In addition, it should also be noted that the 
current guidances and policies do not provide very clear 
                     4 Hatry, Harry, What Type of Performance Information Should be 
Tracked, Managing Performance in American Government, Dall W. Forsythe 
ed., Rockefeller Institute Press, 2001, page 17 
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direction and further doctrine is required to better define 
the two missions.    
C. TERMS OF REFERENCE  
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agent for Homeland 
Security in the maritime domain.  Homeland Security as 
defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security is a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur.5 
 
  
        Goal = Desired outcome
          Objective = Something striven for to achieve desired outputs
               Output = Something produced by the organization
Capability = The abilities necessary to achieve objectives
Broadly defined   
Narrowly defined    
Figure 1.   Goal to capability - flow diagram 
 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is the lead federal 
agent for Homeland Defense.  Homeland Defense is defined in 
the Defense Planning Guidance 2004-2009 as the protection                      5 The Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, July 2002, page 2 
6 
of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population and 
critical defense infrastructure against external threats 
and aggression.  
This thesis is a snap shot in time and the assessments 
and conclusions are based on current guidances and 
policies.  As further clarification is provided with 
respect to the missions of HS and HD the roles and command 
structure may have to be reevaluated.  
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis is intended to show that the apparent seam 
between the Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions 
cannot be simply narrowed with a change in the command 
structure.  The breadth of this seam, rather, is a function 
of information sharing and can only be narrowed by timely 
actionable intelligence.   
In addition, the thesis will also show that more 
guidance is required for the Homeland Security and Homeland 
Defense missions.  
7 
II. CURRENT STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 
In the strategic planning process the first step an 
organization has to undertake in order to fulfill its 
mission is to decide what outcomes it would like to 
achieve.6 The Navy and the Coast Guard have fundamental 
missions that each executes to reach outcomes that have 
been drawn from national strategies.  These missions go 
beyond what is required for HS and HD.   How much beyond is 
an important aspect to consider if one wanted to combine 
the organizations to execute a specific mission.  What 
would then happen to the management of the other missions?  
The major overarching strategies and policies that 
guide the Services include, but are not limited to: The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
the National Military Strategy, and the Defense Planning 
Guidance (the Strategic Planning Guidance was not approved 
at the time of this research).  These strategies were 
chosen because they have the largest effect on DoD.  But 
for HS and HD a couple of other strategies must also be 
considered.  These strategies are:  The National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, the National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 
Assets, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and 
the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.  From these strategies we can identify 
objectives for HS and HD, which can then be compared to the 
Services current missions.  
                      6 Hatry, Harry P., “What Type of Performance Information Should be 
Tracked?”, Managing Performance in American Government, Dall W. 
Forsythe ed., Rockefeller Institute Press, 2001 
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A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY  
The National Security Strategy (NSS) reflects the 
nation’s values and interests.  In accordance with this 
strategy, defending our homeland against its adversaries is 
the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal 
Government.  The strategic goals of the NSS are:  political 
and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, 
and respect for human dignity.7 In addition, the NSS 
specifically states eight objectives to achieve the 
strategic goals:  (1) Champion aspirations for human 
dignity, (2) Strengthen alliances to defeat global 
terrorism and work to prevent attacks against allies, 
friends and the United States, (3) Work with others to 
defuse regional conflicts, (4) Prevent enemies from 
threatening allies, friends and the United States with 
weapons of mass destruction, (5) Ignite a new era of global 
economic growth through free markets and trade, (6) Expand 
the circle of development by opening societies and building 
the infrastructure of democracy, (7) Develop agendas for 
cooperative action with other main centers of global power, 
and (8) Transform America’s national security institutions 
to meet the emerging challenges and opportunities.8 
In addition, the NSS captures the terrorist threat by 
stating that the nation will be menaced less by fleets and 
armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of 
the embittered few.  In essence, to support these goals and 
objectives the Navy strategy must not only be able achieve 
its traditional missions but it must be able handle the new 
emerging threat of the embittered few – the terrorists. 
                     7 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, September 2002, page 1 
8 Ibid. 
9 
Even though the definitions for HS and HD make it 
difficult to distinguish between the two, the NSS 
objectives help to frame the capabilities required for the 
missions.  Additionally, it is clear that not all of the 
NSS objectives are specific to the HS or HD missions.  The 
NSS reaches much beyond the HS and HD framework, which 
means that the Coast Guard and Navy have other roles and 
missions to consider in support of the nations strategic 
goals.  All of these roles must be considered when 
assessing an effective command and control structure.   
B. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY/QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
 
 This nation must have ready forces that can 
bring victory to our country, and safety to our 
people.... innovative doctrine, strategy and 
weaponry.... to revolutionize the battlefield of 
the future and to keep the peace by defining war 
on our terms....  We will build the security of 
America by fighting our enemies abroad, and 
protecting our folks here at home.                                  
President George W. Bush 
The NSS, the National Military Strategy, the Report on 
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the Defense 
Planning Guidance provide the overall strategic framework 
for the DoD.  From these guidances it is clear that 
globalization has fostered a flowering of both wealth and 
technological innovation that has enabled a new dynamic in 
society, the super-empowered non-state actor.  No longer is 
the world divided up in perfect state nations.  The non-
state adversaries transcend the geographical boundaries 
onto a new virtual battlefield.  
The Navy must be flexible enough to surge at a 
moment’s notice to deter, prevent, or interdict these 
10 
adversaries in this new environment.... the foe may be a 
state nation or it could be an Exxon tanker.  In this 
planning process, the Navy considers its missions, looks 
out at its environment and determines its desired outcomes 
(goals) as well as the broad policies and objectives that 
it is hoped will lead to their achievement.9 From these 
reports the following goals and objectives have been 
identified: 
• Assuring allies and friends (goal) 
Objectives – 
o Demonstrate U.S. steadiness of purpose, national 
resolve and military capability to defend and 
advance common interests 
o Strengthen and expand alliances and security 
relationships 
• Dissuading adversaries from developing threatening 
forces or ambitions (goal) 
Objectives – 
o Shape the future military competition in ways 
that are advantageous to the United States 
o Complicate the planning and operations of 
adversaries 
• Deterring aggression and countering coercion against 
the United States, its forces, allies and friends 
(goal) 
Objectives – 
o Develop and maintain the capability to swiftly 
defeat attacks with only modest reinforcement 
                     9 Ibid. 
11 
• At the direction of the President, decisively 
defeating an adversary at the time, place and in the 
manner of U.S. choosing10 (goal) 
In addition to the objectives, the overriding themes 
of prevention and flexibility can be noted.  By using the 
projection of military power we can prevent certain 
situations from occurring.  With the ability of providing a 
greater choice of military options to deal with the 
situation the leadership is given greater flexibility.  
These themes must be remembered when formalizing the HD 
objectives and the command structure.  
C. JOINT OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
The Department of Defense (DoD) recently published the 
Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept.  A Joint 
Operating Concept (JOC) is a description of how a future 
Joint Force Commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, 
and sustain a joint force against potential adversaries’ 
capabilities or crisis situations specified within the 
range of military operations.11 Even though we will see that 
the JOC’s objectives duplicate those of the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, the JOC still gives keen 
insight into the mission requirements.   
The Homeland Security JOC’s central idea is that the 
first line of defense is performed overseas through 
traditional military operations to stop potential threats 
before they can directly threaten the Homeland, but that 
not all potential threats can be prevented – a layered 
                     10 The Secretary of Defense, Defense Planning Guidance 2004-2009, May 
2002, page 7 
11 The Secretary of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts, November 
2003, page 17 
12 
defense is required.12 With a layered defense there will be 
a series of opportunities for countering the threat.  This 
layered defense is divided into three regions:  the Forward 
Regions, the Approaches, and the Homeland (Figure 2). 
The Forward Regions are foreign land areas, sovereign 
airspace, and sovereign waters outside the Homeland.13  The 
Forward Regions can be thought of as the first line of 
defense.  The next line, or second line of defense, is the 
Approaches.  The Approaches is a conceptual region 
extending from the limits of the Homeland to the boundaries 
of the Forward Regions that is based on intelligence – once 
intelligence has indicated a threat is en route to the 
Homeland, it is considered to be in the Approaches.14  The 
last line is the Homeland.  The Homeland is a physical 
region that includes the 50 states, U.S. territories and  
Figure 2.   Comprehensive layered defense 
(From:  Homeland Security JOC 2004) 
                     12 Department of Defense, Homeland Defense Joint Operational Concept, 





possessions in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, and the 
immediate surrounding sovereign waters and airspace.15 It is 
with this layered defense that the JOC’s goal can be 
achieved; to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 
aggression against the United States as early and as far 
from its borders as possible so as to minimize their 
effects on United States society and interests.16  The JOC 
identifies the following as required capabilities: 
• Detect and prevent potential threats to the Homeland 
as they arise in the Forward Regions 
• Detect and defeat ballistic missile attacks on the 
Homeland  
• Detect and defeat airborne threats to the Homeland  
• Deter and defend against hostile space systems 
threatening the Homeland  
• Detect and defeat maritime threats to the Homeland  
• Deter and defend against physical and cyber threats to 
DoD critical infrastructure in the Homeland    
• Project power to defend the Homeland    
• Prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple 
simultaneous CBRNE events 
• Conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support (CS) 
operations and Emergency Planning (EP) activities 
while:  operating as Lead Federal Agent (LFA), 
                     15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.  Page 15 
14 
providing support to a LFA, and during transitions of 
responsibility 
• Conduct Homeland Defense and CS operations and EP 
planning activities when responsibilities overlap and 
in the absence of a formal designation of LFA.17 
But these identified capabilities are very general and 
loosely defined.  Since they describe something to strive 
for and do not necessarily outline a specific ability they 
will be referred to as objectives throughout the remainder 
of this thesis.  This is in accordance with the model 
discussed in the introduction. 
Even though the JOC formulates how the joint force 
will operate in the next 15 years, arguably, the identified 
objectives can be used to describe the present day 
requirement.  This is because the objectives listed in the 
JOC mirror those of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  The Navy presently has various capabilities to 
apply to operations in support of the HS objectives.  But 
the Navy must also utilize these same capabilities to 
achieve objectives that are not specific to the HS and HD 
missions.  This must be taken into account during the 
command structure assessment process.   
D. THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Most post September 11, 2001 threat estimates and 
policy guidance indicate that the world in the near future 
holds uncertain elements and continued anti-U.S. 
underpinnings and that the “antipathy of our (U.S.) enemies 
may well be increasing, and new enemies may emerge.18  The 
                     17 Ibid.  Page 20 
18 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, July 2002, page 7 
15 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHLS) calls on 
the nation to cooperate together to protect our Nation from 
these enemies.   
The strategy further identifies three strategic 
objectives, which mirror the definition for Homeland 
Security: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks with the United 
States 
• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism 
• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur19 
But these objectives are very broad and resemble what 
most would consider goals – desired outcomes.  The NSHLS 
does provide further clarity for each objective and these 
are listed as follows: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks  
Specific Objectives - 
o Deter all potential terrorist 
o Defeat terrorism wherever it appears 
o Detect terrorists before they strike 
o Prevent their instruments of terror from 
entering the country 
o Eliminate the threat terrorist pose20 
• Reduce vulnerabilities  
Specific Objectives – 
o Prevent an ever-evolving target 
o Government to work with private sector to 
identify and protect critical infrastructure 
and key assets 
                     19 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, July 2002, page vii 
20 Ibid.  Page 2 
16 
o Government to work with private sector to 
detect terrorist threats 
o Government to work with private sector to 
augment our defense 
o Mitigate risk against economic costs and 
infringements on individual liberty21 
• Minimize the damage and recover  
Specific Objectives – 
o Prepare to manage the consequence of future 
attacks 
o Improve systems and prepare the individuals 
that will respond to the terrorist attack 
o Build and maintain various financial, legal, 
and social systems to recover from all forms 
of terrorism 
o Protect and restore institutions needed to 
sustain economic growth and confidence 
o Rebuild destroyed property 
o Assist victims and their families 
o Heal psychological wounds22 
 
From these objectives, and the ones mentioned 
previously, the HS and HD missions can now be better 
defined.  As the scope for each mission area takes shape 
there becomes a better understanding of the requirements.  
Once the requirements are established it becomes clear to 
see what level of resources must be committed so that each 
Service can complete not only the HS/D objectives, but also 
the other national objectives.   
                     21 Ibid.  Page 3 
22 Ibid.  Page 3 
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As the lead federal agent for Homeland Security in the 
maritime domain, the Coast Guard’s strategy for Homeland 
Security identifies the following objectives: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks within, and terrorist 
exploitation of, the U.S. Maritime Domain 
• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism within the 
U.S. Maritime Domain 
• Protect U.S. population centers, critical 
infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal 
approaches, and the boundaries and seams among them 
• Protect the U.S. Marine Transportation System while 
preserving the freedom of the U.S. Maritime Domain for 
legitimate pursuits 
• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may 
occur within the U.S. Maritime Domain as either the 
LFA or a supporting agency23 
Like the NSHLS, the objectives listed by the Coast Guard 
describe a desired outcome and not necessarily a specific 
item to strive for to achieve desired outputs (Figure 1).  
                     23 The USCG, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, December 2002, 
page 2 
Mission Statement:  Protect the U.S. Maritime Domain and the
U.S. Marine Transportation System and deny their use and
exploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks on U.S.
territory, population, and critical infrastructure.  Prepare for
and, in the event of attack, conduct emergency response
operations.  When directed, as the supported or supporting
commander, conduct military homeland defense operations. 
THE U.S. COAST GUARD MARITIME STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
18 
However, the strategy further states maritime strategic 
elements.  These elements are more inline with how the 
objectives in the previously discussed documents are 
scoped.  To complete the HS and HD mission defining process 
the elements will be used as objectives.  These objectives 
are as follows:  
• Increase Maritime Domain Awareness 
• Conduct Enhanced Maritime Security Operations 
• Close Port Security Gaps 
• Build Critical Security Capabilities 
• Leverage Partnerships to Mitigate Security Risks 
• Ensure Readiness for Homeland Defense Operations24 
 
F. HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE OBJECTIVES 
We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his 
plans and confront the worst threats before they 
emerge.  In the world we have entered, the only 
path to safety is the path of action.  And this 
nation will act. 
President George W. Bush 
United States Military Academy at West Point 
1 June 2002 
From the guidances and policy statements mentioned 
above we can now identify objectives for the missions of HS 
and HD (Table 1).  These objectives are an interpretation 
due to the disparity that existed between the way goals and 
objectives were used in each document.  But before the 
objectives are categorized there are two fundamental 
operational themes that must be looked at and considered. 
First, the Coast Guard imply in their mission 
statement for HS that the operational focus is on the 
                     24 Ibid.  Page 3 
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homeland.  They do this by framing their mission statement 
within the context of protecting only the U.S. maritime 
domain, population, territory, and critical infrastructure. 
This will mean that even though the identified objectives 
for HS may have similarities to those of HD, they are 
distinctly different due to the Coast Guards focus on the 
homeland.  This difference translates into vastly different 
capability requirements and missions.   
Second, while the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the 
United States, the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats 
before they reach our borders.25 President George W. Bush 
further stated at the Capital on 29 January 2002, “America 
is no longer protected by vast oceans.  We are protected 
from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased 
vigilance at home.”  
This “preemptive away game” philosophy was also 
captured by Admiral Vern Clark in a Proceedings article – 
Homeland defense will be accomplished by a national effort 
that integrates forward deployed naval forces with the 
other military services, civil authorities, and 
intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.  Working with 
the newly established Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), we 
will identify, track, and intercept dangers long before 
they threaten our homeland.26 This preemptive strategy 
mandates a forward deployed force requirement.  In summary, 
                     25 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, page 2 
26 Admiral Vern Clark, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities, 
Proceedings, October 2003, 
http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROcno10.htm 
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the current doctrine has Coast Guard focusing on the home 
land and the Navy in the forward regions.   
This does not mean that the Coast Guard should not 
have an expeditionary role, or that the Navy should not 
support the homeland operations.  But these underlying 
themes need to be considered when reviewing the objectives 




Table 1.   Maritime - Homeland Security and Homeland Defense 
objectives 
 HOMELAND SECURITY OBJECTIVE 
MARITIME DOMAIN 
HOMELAND DEFENSE OBJECTIVE 
MARITIME DOMAIN 
NATIONAL 
GUIDANCE • Prevent enemies from threatening allies, friends and 
the United States with weapons 
of mass destruction 
• Defeat terrorism wherever it 
appears 
• Detect terrorists before they 
strike  
• Prevent their instruments of 
terror from entering the 
country 
• Government to work with private 
sector to detect terrorist 
threats 
• Government to work with private 
sector to identify and protect 
critical infrastructure and key 
assets 
• Mitigate risk against economic 
costs and infringements on 
individual liberty 
• Increase Maritime Domain 
Awareness 
• Conduct Enhanced Maritime 
Security Operations 
• Close Port Security Gaps 
• Build Critical Security 
Capabilities 
• Leverage Partnerships to 
Mitigate Security Risks 
• Ensure Readiness for Homeland 
Defense Operations 
 
• Strengthen alliances to defeat 
global terrorism and work to 
prevent attacks against allies, 
friends and the United States 
• Work with others to defuse 
regional conflicts 
• Prevent enemies from threatening 
allies, friends and the United 
States with weapons of mass 
destruction 
• Demonstrate U.S. steadiness of 
purpose, national resolve and 
military capability to defend 
and advance common interests 
• Strengthen and expand alliances 
and security relationships  
• Shape the future military 
competition in ways that are 
advantageous to the United 
States  
• Complicate the planning and 
operations of adversaries 
• Develop and maintain the 
capability to swiftly defeat 
attacks with only modest 
reinforcement 
• Deter all potential terrorist 
• Defeat terrorism wherever it 
appears 
• Detect terrorists before they 
strike 
• Prevent their instruments of 
terror from entering the country 
• Eliminate the threat terrorist 
pose 
• Prevent an ever-evolving target 
• Government to work with private 
sector to detect terrorist 
threats 
• Government to work with private 
sector to augment our defense 
• Increase Maritime Domain 
Awareness 
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III. NAVY MISSIONS 
With a general framework developed for the HS and HD 
objectives, an assessment against the Services capabilities 
and missions can now be made.  This evaluation will give an 
indication of how the Homeland Security/Defense (HS/D) 
capability requirements compare to the spectrum of Service 
missions. 
Traditionally the Navy has maintained a forward 
presence in their support of the National Security 
Strategy.  In 1989, Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy at the time, had shifted the homeland defense 
strategy from coastal patrol to power projection based on 
the philosophy that the best defense is a good offense.  
Operating from this forward presence posture, naval forces 
execute their missions to achieve the objectives that are 
established from the goals established in national 
strategies.     
VADM Turner, in the 1998 Naval Warfare College Review, 
summarized the traditional Navy missions as follows:  (1) 
Strategic Deterrence - to deter all-out attack on the 
United States or its allies, to discourage any potential 
aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with 
unacceptable risks, to maintain a stable political 
environment within which the threat of aggression or 
coercion against the U.S. or its allies is minimized; (2) 
Sea Control - to ensure industrial supplies, to 
reinforce/resupply military forces engaged overseas, to 
provide wartime economic/military supplies to allies, to 
provide safety for naval forces in the projection of power 
ashore role; (3) Projection of Power Ashore - to secure 
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territory from which a land campaign can be launched, to 
secure a land area from which an air operation can be 
launched, to secure selected territory or facility to deny 
the adversary its use, to destroy adversary facilities 
(Communication, logistics, etc.); and (4) Naval Presence 
Mission - to deter actions inimical to the interests of the 
United States or its allies, to encourage actions that are 
in the interests of the United States or its allies.27  
These traditional missions are now embedded in the Navy’s 
future operating concept – Sea Power 21. 
A. SEA POWER 21 
Essentially the Navy’s traditional missions have not 
changed within the Sea Power 21 concept (Figure 3).  
However, with Sea Power 21 the Navy force planning has been 
shifted to create capabilities that will be able to handle 
today’s wide spectrum of military conflicts.  In addition 
the force-planning shift will provide greater operational 
flexibility to the warfighter and the National Command 
Authority. 
Sea Power 21 is comprised of three fundamental 
concepts; Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  Sea 
Strike is the ability to project precise and persistent 
offensive power from the sea; Sea Shield extends defensive 
assurance throughout the world; and Sea Basing enhances 
operational independence and support for the joint force.28 
ForceNet will enable Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea 
Basing.  ForceNet is the operational construct and 
                     27 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, Missions of the U.S. Navy, NWC 
Review, Winter 1998, 
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1998/winter/art10w98.htm 
28 Admiral Vern Clark, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities, Naval 
Institute Proceedings, October 2002 
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architectural framework for naval warfare in the 
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Figure 3.   Sea Power 21 
 
networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into 
a networked, distributed combat force that is scalable 
across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea 
to land.29  
Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet each 
have specific capabilities that enable the Navy to achieve 
its objectives and produce the outcomes that support the 
national strategies.  But not all of the capabilities are 
required to carry out the HS and HD missions, or are they? 
B. NAVY CAPABILITIES 
The requirements for the HS and HD missions are still 
maturing.  But from a snap shot of the current guidance’s a 
general set of objectives have been identified and listed 
in Table 1.  An evaluation of Sea Power 21 focused 
capabilities with the objectives identified in Table 1 will 
                     29 Vice Admiral Richard Mayo and Vice Admiral John Nathman, ForceNet:  
Turning Information into Power, Naval Institute Proceedings, February 
2003 
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give an indication of how the Navy’s capabilities, which 
were programmed to meet all the requirements outlined in 
the national strategies, are aligned to support the HS/D 





Figure 4.   Navy Capability Pillars 
 
From this comparison there is an indication that each 
one of the Navy’s focused capabilities can be used to 
fulfill the requirements to meet the objectives for the HD 
mission.  Additionally, the comparison also shows that a 
few of the capabilities could be used to support the Coast 
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Guard’s HS mission.  However, as a reminder, the 
requirements for the HS and HD missions are still maturing 
and that this assessment is a rough “snap shot” in time.  
As the objectives for the two mission areas become better 
defined the Navy may have to adapt its capabilities to 
support HD.   
In summary, the Navy’s capabilities are best suited 
for the HD mission, as might be expected.  A few of their 
capabilities could be used to support the Coast Guard in 
the HS mission but these capabilities were not specifically 
programmed and resourced for that mission.  This is an 
important point that must be considered in the development 
of the command and control structure.  Even though the Navy 
can support the HS mission, its capabilities and 
organizational focus are directed and best suited for HD.  
How are there gains in the efficiency and effectiveness of 
operations if the command structure is mixed with other 
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IV. COAST GUARD MISSIONS 
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agent for Homeland 
Security missions in the maritime domain.  In this 
capacity, the Coast Guard is in charge of reducing, 
preempting, deterring and defending against security 
threats targeting ports, waterways and the coastal areas of 
the United States and its territories.  The Espionage Act 
of 1917 and the Magnuson Act of 1950 provide the Coast 
Guard with the authority to safeguard all vessels, ports 
and facilities from acts of sabotage or other subversive 
acts.30  As a unique instrument of national security, the 
Coast Guard is the only military service with civil law 
enforcement authority, regulatory and safety 
responsibilities, and Captain of the Port Authorities.31  
As Title 14 U.S.C. 89, the Coast Guard personnel have 
law enforcement authority on, and over the high seas and 
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.32 
Title 14 U.S.C. 1 and 2 state that the Coast Guard is a 
military service and a branch of the armed forces at all 
times and that it must maintain a state of readiness to 
function as a specialized Service in the Navy in time of 
war.33 It is also specifically authorized to work closely, 
and cooperatively with the Navy during peacetime (14 USC 
                     30 Testimony by RADM Paul Pluta to the House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International 
Relations, Committee on Government Reform; Homeland Security:  Securing 
Strategic Ports, 23 July 2002 
31 Ibid. 




145), and assist the DoD in performance of any activity for 
which the Coast Guard is especially qualified (14 USC 141).   
The Coast Guard is in a unique position.  It operates 
under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but it is 
also a military Service.  DHS was established through the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to better coordinate the 
capabilities of numerous federal agencies to protect the 
U.S. from terrorist attacks, and provide for a better-
coordinated defense of the homeland.  For Homeland Security 
missions the Coast Guard has over 95,000 miles of coastline 
and 361 ports to protect.34  
Should the maritime or surface elements of America’s 
global transportation system be used as a weapon delivery 
device, the response right now would almost certainly be to 
shut the system down at an enormous cost to the economies 
of the United States and its trade partners.35 As we learned 
from the September 2002 Los Angeles/Long Beach labor 
dispute, economic losses from a major port shut down can be 
staggering, estimated a $20 billion for that 11 day period.  
In a recent study published after the events of September 
11, the Brookings Institution concluded that a catastrophic 
attack on the maritime industry using a nuclear device 
concealed in a shipping container could cause damage and 
disruption costing the U.S. economy as much as $1 
trillion.36 
                     34 Department of Transportation, Statement of Admiral James M. Loy on 
Strengthening U.S. Security Against Maritime Threats Before the 
Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries, U.S. Senate, 11 October 2001 
35 America Still Unprepared – America Still in Danger,” Report of an 
Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 
Co-chairs former U.S. Senator Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, October 
2002, page 9 
36 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I.M. Destler 
, David L. Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James D. Steinberg, “Protecting 
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Like the Navy, the Coast Guard has organizational 
objectives that are not related to HS or the DoD mission of 
HD.  The traditional Coast Guard missions include: 
• Ports, waterways and coastal security 
• Drug interdiction 
• Migrant interdiction 
• Other law enforcement 
• Defense Readiness 
• Search and rescue 
• Aids to navigation 
• Living marine resources 
• Marine environmental protection 
• Ice operations 
• Marine safety37 
It can be seen above that not all of the areas support 
the HS mission (figure 5).  These missions that do not 
contribute to the HS objectives are not less important.  
These missions have a long-standing requirement that still 
holds true and therefore must be accomplished.  The Coast 
Guard has missions that might indirectly support HS but for 
he most part they are stand-alone missions.   
 
                     
the American Homeland:  A Preliminary Analysis,” Brookings Institution 
Press, 2002, page 9 
37 Senior Leadership Working Group, Navy-Coast Guard Senior 
Leadership Talks, January 2004 
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Figure 5.   Coast Guard Missions 
 
A. U.S. COAST GUARD’S MARITIME STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY  
As the lead federal agent for Homeland Security in the 
maritime domain, the Coast Guard developed a strategy for 
HS and identified the following objectives: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks within, and terrorist 
exploitation of, the U.S. Maritime Domain 
• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism within 
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• Protect U.S. population centers, critical 
infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal 
approaches, and the boundaries and seams among them 
• Protect the U.S. Marine Transportation System while 
preserving the freedom of the U.S. Maritime Domain 
for legitimate pursuits 
• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 
may occur within the U.S. Maritime Domain as either 
the LFA or a supporting agency38 
The Coast Guard objectives for HS appear to have 
similarities to the objectives required of the Navy for HD.  
But from what was discussed earlier, the Coast Guard 
objectives are focused on the U.S. maritime domain and 
population centers while the Navy objectives are focused on 
the forward regions.  This distinction is very important 
because it sets, for the most part, different objectives 
and, in turn, different capability requirements.  So even 
when there is mission overlap each Service brings a unique 
capability and ability (organizing, training, equipping, 
and legal) to the situation.   This is actually a benefit 
because the different capabilities and abilities provide a 
greater flexibility to the leadership in how they handle 
the situation. 
In summary, even with mission overlap each of the 
Service’s possess unique capabilities.  The Navy’s current 
capabilities are better aligned with the HD mission and the 
Coast Guard has to balance their capabilities’ with the HS 
and non-HS missions.  These qualities appear to be three 
competing interest and may not integrate well when combined 
                     38 U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Maritime Strategy for Homeland 
Security, Coast Guard Publication 3-01, December 2002 
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into a single organization’s operation planning process.  
Centralized direction is a fundamental tenet of command and 
control.39  
 
                     39 Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, Publication NWC, Newport:  
Naval War College, Page 187 
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V. COMMAND STRUCTURE 
The DoD has divided the globe into five geographical 
areas, which are the responsibility of combatant commands.  
A combatant command is a unified or specified command with 
a broad continuing mission under a single commander 
established and so designated by the President, through the 
Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and with the advice and 
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.40 
The Services organize, train, and equip for combatant 
commander employment in the execution of that mission.     
The regional combatant commander for the homeland is 
Commander, US Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM).  
CDRUSNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct operations to deter, 
prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the 
United States, its territories, and interests within the 
assigned area of responsibility and as directed by the 
President or Secretary of Defense, provide military 
assistance to civil authorities including consequence 
management operations.41  CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for 
the Homeland Defense mission in the air, land, and maritime 
domains for the 48 contiguous states, District of Columbia, 
Alaska, Canada, and all approaches to North America.   
The Navy has been tasked to support USNORTHCOM’s 
mission to deter and defend against hostile action from 
maritime threats by providing defense in depth that is 
seamless, unpredictable to our enemies, and able to defeat 
                     40 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0/Doctrine for Joint 
Operations, 10 September 2001, page II-12 
41 Northern Command, Campaign Plan for Homeland Security, 1 October 
2002, page 20 
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threats at a maximum distance from U.S. territory.42 The 
USNORTHCOM mission statement is broad but it does mirror 
language contained in the national strategies.  
Unfortunately, except for the HS JOC and the current 
execution orders, there is no other doctrine to guide the 
Navy within the HS and HD missions.  Without a doubt, the 
lack of guidance compounds the confusion during the phase 
of the mission when HS and HD overlap.  A response to 
resolve this concern has been to address the current 
command structure.   
As a combatant commander, USNORTHCOM has the authority 
to prescribe the chain of command and organize the commands 
and forces within the command.  The component commands 
under USNORTHCOM have representation from the Army, Navy, 
Marines, and Air Force.  Although it is a Service, the 
Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and they have a coordinating relationship with 
USNORTHCOM.  Any use of Coast Guard resources would have to 
be approved by DHS.      
The chain of command established by USNORTHCOM is 
unique in some respects, due to the way forces are 
assigned, but the vertical line to the Service components 
is typical for combatant commands (Figure 6).  The Navy 
component to USNORTHCOM is the commander for USNAVNORTH.  
In addition, a functional commander for the maritime domain 
has been established with the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Command (JFMCC).  The JFMCC is the joint force 
commander’s maritime manager.   
                      42 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress on The 















Figure 6.   USNORTHCOM Command Structure 
 
But does this command structure effectively use the 
national maritime resources?  If a Maritime Interagency 
Task Force was established would the HS and HD mission 
overlap in the maritime domain be better managed?   
A. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE 
The main function of an interagency task force (IATF) 
is to coordinate activities among organizations working 
activities of common interest.  Working as a single entity 
the organization could establish processes to improve 
information sharing and coordinate the employment of 
resources for greater effectiveness. 
Successful examples of the IATF concept are the Joint 
Interagency Task Forces (JIATF).  The JIATFs’ were 
established as a result of Presidential Decision Directive 
14 that ordered a review of the nation’s command and 
control and intelligence centers involved in international 
counter narcotics operations.43  A few of the organizations 
                     43 Global Security, Joint Interagency Task Force,  
www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jitf.htm 
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that support the JIATF are DoD, the Department of Homeland 
Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. 
Providing the right mixes of capabilities and 
effectively controlling the execution of those capabilities 
is, without question, essential to the success of any 
operation.  But the success of the JIATF concept in counter 
narcotics is based on coordination of multiple agencies 
into a single mission.  This is not the same for HS and HD.  
For HS and HD there are not only multiple agencies 
executing multiple missions, but in some cases there also 
exist mission overlap between these same agencies.  This 
critical point makes the application of the JIATF concept 
to HS/D much different than to the mission of counter 
narcotics.  In addition, HS/D in the maritime domain is a 
global mission, which makes the assignment of forces a 
challenging problem.  Are the forces in the Persian Gulf 
assigned to the regional combatant commander, or the IATF?  
If the IATF then how is the combatant commander’s 
requirements fulfilled? This does not appear to be an 
efficient process. 
Finally, from early discussion it was shown that even 
though the Navy can support the HS mission, capabilities 
are more directed and best utilized in HD – especially the 
“away” game.   Whereas, the Coast Guard is focused on the 
homeland and they must balance HS and non-HS missions.  How 
could an IATF balance such diverse operational 
requirements?  The scope would be too narrowly focused and 
the other mission requirements would most likely be 
affected from a lack of resources.    We must develop a 
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command and control system that can achieve a steady state, 
not a fragmentation of roles and responsibilities.44 
The IATF concept does have merit.  Although it may not 
be efficient for the operational prosecution phase, it 
could be very effective for building the operational 
picture in the maritime domain.    
As stated earlier, a focus on intelligence and 
information sharing is more critical to minimizing the 
seams between HS and HD than shaking up the command 
structure. 
                     44 The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Report), 
Forging America’s New Normalcy, The 5th annual report to the President 

























In the war on terror, knowledge is power. 
                     President George W. Bush 
   East Room, The White House 
   8 October 2001  
  
  Ninety-five percent of all non-North American 
foreign trade and 100 percent of foreign oil imports pass 
through American ports.45  Over 200 million intermodel 
containers traveled the world’s seas in 2002, carrying 
about 90 percent of all goods involved in global trade.46  
Approximately 21,000 of these containers arrive in the U.S. 
daily, with more than six million arriving annually.47 Some 
of the largest vessels carry up to six thousand containers.  
If a terrorist group decided to bring in a weapon of mass 
destruction via a container it would be like trying to find 
a needle in a haystack.  In addition, the ships themselves 
have many nooks and crannies that make inspections 
difficult if not impossible.  Even slowing the flow long 
enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant 
random selection of imports would be economically 
intolerable.48 The requirement to feed America’s economic 
machine is an area that could be easily exploited by a 
terrorist organization. 
                     45 Hecker, J. Z., Port Security:  Nation Faces Formidable Challenges 
in Making New Initiative Successful (GAO Publication No. GAO-02-993T).  
Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office, page 3 
46 U.S. State Department, Maritime Administration wants to expand 
port security zone, Retrieved October 10, 2003, from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror02022701.htm 
47 Hecker, J. Z., Port Security:  Nation Faces Formidable Challenges 
in Making New Initiative Successful (GAO Publication No. GAO-02-993T).  
Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office, page 3 
48 Ibid. 
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An explosion of a weapon “of any type” would have 
implications not only for all U.S. ports, but also the 
ports worldwide.  If we shut down our ports following an 
attack, like we did the air traffic on 9/11, it would have 
a devastating effect on the U.S. economy.  Ships would be 
prevented from docking and unloading, trains and trucks 
would feel the cascading effects as the inventory of goods 
slowly becomes reduced, and overseas ports would need to 
close their gates due to limited pier space as goods set 
for export backed up.  So dependent on intermodal 
containers has industry become, that a three to four week 
closure of U.S. ports would bring the container industry, 
and subsequently global trade, “to its knees.”49 “The only 
thing that can prevent it . . . is intelligence and careful 
screening of all the unfamiliar vessels coming into your 
port,” said Fer van de Laar, safety manager for the 
International Association of Ports and Harbors. 
The Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Joint 
Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) is 
DoD’s lead national level intelligence organization for 
indications and warning, the production of timely all 
source intelligence, integration of national level analytic 
efforts on all aspects of the terrorist threat, and 
development and maintenance of an accurate, up to date 
knowledge base on terrorism related information.50  The 
Director, JITF-CT also serves as the DoD focal point and 
senior Defense Intelligence representative within the 
                     49 Council on Foreign Relations, America – Still unprepared, still in 
danger, Retrieved September 21, 2003, from 
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/homeland_TF.pdf 
50 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report to Congress on The 
Role of the Department of Defense in Supporting Homeland Security, 
September 2003 
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Intelligence Community for terrorist threat warning, 
proposing and coordinating within the intelligence 
community promulgation of such warnings to appropriate DoD 
organizations and combatant commands.51 
Since 11 September 2001, our federal, state, and local 
agencies have been working together to improve the 
information sharing processes.  In 2003 the President 
instructed the Director of the Central Intelligence, the 
Director of the FBI, and the Secretaries of Homeland 
Security and Defense to develop the Nation’s first unified 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).  
The TTIC merges and analysis terrorist-related 
information collected domestically and abroad in order to 
form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.  As a 
partner in the new TTIC, DoD intelligence and investigative 
elements collaborate with other participating organizations 
in developing terrorist threat assessments for our national 
leadership, for the operating forces, and for the DHS.   
These are great steps forward but much more can and 
should be done, specifically in the maritime domain.   
Collectively, the agencies involved in the maritime domain 
need to provide the nation with a robust capability to 
identify, track, and, where appropriate, intercept 
suspicious cargo and vessels as far from U.S. shores as 
possible. The Navy and the Coast Guard should be assigned 
active roles in the operation of this national maritime-
surveillance system-of-systems.  This is the key to 
managing the seams between agencies that have overlapping 
missions in the maritime domain.  With actionable 
intelligence the seams will be transparent.  An IATF to                      51 Ibid. 
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build and maintain this maritime domain awareness would 
probably be the most effective command and control 
structure. 
This Maritime IATF would only be responsible for the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of maritime 
intelligence.  The operational components, if required, 
would be used for surveillance and information gathering - 
not for operational prosecution.  
For example, if a situation is determined by higher 
authority to be a law enforcement matter, than the Coast 
Guard would be directed to intercept the vessel and the 
Navy could be requested to support.  If, on the other hand, 
higher authority pronounces it to be a military mission 
than the Department of Defense would intercept and the 
combatant commander, whose area of responsibility is 
applicable, would be responsible for the event.   
Combatant Commanders, law enforcement officials, joint 
forces, state and local leaders, just to name a few of the 
possible stakeholders, would all have access to this 
maritime intelligence.  The maritime intelligence conduit 
would touch all geographical boundaries and all 
participating organizational structures (figure 7).    
Today, there is already an established maritime 
intelligence center – the National Maritime Intelligence 
Center (NMIC).  The NMIC houses the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI), Coast Guard’s Information Coordination 
Center (ICC) and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 
(MCIA).  ONI, with the MCIA, ICC, Drug Enforcement Agency, 
and U.S. Customs, has devoted an increased effort to non-
traditional maritime intelligence missions.  These have 
included expanded reporting and analysis of merchant ship 
45 
activity.  In addition, ONI now supports U.S. Northern 
Command’s Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center, and 
other federal, state, and local agencies to identify and 
monitor civil maritime threats to the homeland. 
The NMIC is not a “national” maritime intelligence 
center in the true sense of the word.  It is a structure 
that houses separate intelligence agencies that support 
their respective Services.  If the IATF concept were 
developed further and eventually implemented for maritime 
intelligence gathering, it would make perfect sense to 
modify the NMIC to fill this role.  The question that now 
arises:  Which agency will have oversight (authority and 
budgetary) of the NMIC?  The Department of Homeland 
Security, DoD, and the Central Intelligence Agency are just 
a few of the possible lead federal agencies.   
































































Presently the current guidance for HS and HD do not 
adequately define the operational objectives for the 
missions.  Without these clear objectives the capabilities 
and requirements cannot be properly determined.  Attempting 
to build a command structure without fully understanding 
these areas may not be the best course of action at this 
point in time.   
Providing the right mixes of capabilities and 
effectively controlling the execution of those capabilities 
is, without question, essential to the success of any 
operation.  This is the fundamental point that makes the 
IATF command structure for HS/D operations a poor choice.  
Both Services conduct operations that are not related to 
the HS and HD missions.  Attempting to balance the various 
operational priorities would be burdensome and in all 
likelihood ineffective.   In addition, HS/D in the maritime 
domain is a global mission, which makes the assignment of 
forces a challenging problem.  Are the forces assigned to 
the regional combatant commanders, or the IATF?  If the 
IATF then how is the combatant commander’s requirements 
fulfilled? This does not appear to be an efficient process. 
Finally, from early discussion it was shown that even 
though the Navy can support the HS mission, capabilities 
are more directed and best utilized in HD – especially the 
“away” game.   Whereas, the Coast Guard is focused on the 
homeland and they must balance HS and non-HS missions.  How 
could an IATF balance such diverse operational 
requirements?  The scope would be too narrowly focused and 
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the other mission requirements would most likely be 
affected from a lack of resources.     
The national requirements make it impossible to 
achieve unity of effort between the Navy and Coast Guard 
due to the diverse mission responsibilities.  A more 
effective approach would be to maintain the current 
organizational command structures and continue to exercise 
the support/supporting relationships.  In this manner the 
Services can optimize the use of their capabilities for 
their other competing requirements.  There will never be a 
100 percent guarantee of security for our people, the 
economy, and our society – it is not achievable and draws 
our attention from those things that can be accomplished.52     
The protection of assets in the maritime domain is a 
complex national and international problem.  The maritime 
threat demands attention and response.53  The most effective 
response is to improve the sharing of information.  The 
apparent seam between the HS and HD missions cannot be 
simply narrowed with a change in the command structure.  
The breadth of this seam, rather, is a function of 
information sharing and can only be narrowed by timely 
actionable intelligence.   
Information must be able to move more freely amongst 
partner nations, law enforcement organizations, private 
industry, state and local governments, and other federal 
agencies.  The IATF concept may be the best structure for 
                     52 The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Report), 
Forging America’s New Normalcy, The 5th annual report to the President 




this requirement.  Working as a single entity the 
organization could establish processes to improve the flow 
of information.  This IATF would collect, analyze, and 
disseminate intelligence.  The IATF would not have the 
responsibility or capability to intercept a vessel of 
interest.  This intercept would be the responsibility of 
the organization selected by higher authority as the lead 
federal agent, which could be anyone of the stakeholders.  
With timely and accurate intelligence the Services 
will be able to transition between HS and HD, integrate 
with partner nations, state and local authorities, other 
federal agencies.  The seam between the two mission areas 













 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
51 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Anderson, Michael and Bruce Winterstine, Gaps, 
Deficiencies, and the C4ISR Solution, Sea Power, February 
2003 
Ansley, Jason, Maritime Homeland Security/Defense Command 
and Control:  One Team – One Fight, Naval War College, 3 
February 2003 
Bauby, Scott, Maritime Homeland Command and Control – 
Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks, Naval War College, 4 
February 2002 
Chief of Naval Operations, CNO Guidance for 2003 – 
Achieving Sea Power 21 
Chief of Naval Operations, Vern, Projecting Decisive Joint 
Capabilities, Proceedings, October 2002 
Chief of Naval Operations, Sea Power 21 – Protecting 
Decisive Joint Capabilities, U.S. Navy Proceedings, October 
2002 
Daalder, Ivo and others, Protecting the American Homeland:  
One Year On, The Brookings Institution, January 2003 
Defense Science Board, Defense Science Board 2003 Summer 
Study on DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security, 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, November 2003 
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland 
Security, Maritime Operational Policy Review Tabletop 
Exercise, After Action Report, 8 December 2003 
Department of Defense, Homeland Security Joint Operating 
Concept, February 2004 
52 
Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Establishment 
of U.S. Northern Command, September 2003 
DiIorio, Salina and Others, Protecting U.S. Maritime Ports:  
Addressing Intermodal Container Security to Prevent Nuclear 
Terrorist Attacks, MPP 510 Policy Memo, 18 December 2003 
Fritz, Alarik and others, Navy Role in Homeland Defense 
Against Asymmetric Threats – Volume One:  Summary Report, 
Center for Naval Analysis, CRM D0002158.A2, September 2001 
Fritz, Alarik and others, Navy Role in Homeland Defense 
Against Asymmetric Threats – Volume Two:  Appendices, 
Center for Naval Analysis, CRM D0002159.A2, September 2001 
Gilmore III, James and others, V. Forging America’s New 
Normalcy – Securing Our Homeland, Protecting Our Liberty, 
The Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress 
of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 15 December 2003 
Jones, James, Command and Control Domestic Maritime 
Disaster Response Operations, Naval War College, 5 February 
2001 
McGrath III, James, Maritime Homeland Defense Command and 
Control:  What is the Right Arrangement?, Naval War 
College, 1 February 2002 
Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, July 2002 
Risner, Claudia and others, Keeping Terrorists out of the 
Box:  Examining Policies to Counter Seaborne Container 
Terrorism, Harvard University – John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, 19 July 2003 
53 
 
Rivkin, David and Lee Casey, From The Bermuda to the So 
San, National Review, 2 January 2003 
Secretary Of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts, November 
2003 
Swartz, Peter, Forward…From the Start:  The U.S. Navy & 
Homeland Defense:  1775-2003, The Center for Naval 
Analysis, COP D0006678.A1, February 2003 
Tangredi, Sam, Globalization and Maritime Power, Institute 
for National Strategic Studies – National Defense 
University, 2002 
U.S. Coast Guard, G-I Pelorus:  Maritime Security 
Regulations, www.cgweb.uscg.mil, 22 January 2003 
U.S. Coast Guard, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, 
Coast Guard Publication 3-01, December 2002 
U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Strategic Plan 
1999, www.uscg.mil 
U.S. Department of Defense, The DoD Role in Homeland 
Security, Defense Study and Report to Congress, July 2003 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Protecting Americas 
Ports – Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 1 
July 2003 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Tom Ridge 





U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard – Comprehensive 
Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and 
Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-544T, 12 March 
2003 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard – Strategy 
Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All 
Missions, GAO-03-155, November 2002 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Defense – 
Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and Domestic 
Missions Impact DoD Forces, GAO-03-677T 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 
Joint Publication 3-0, 10 September 2001 
U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, MOA Between DoD and DHS for 
the inclusion of the U.S. Coast Guard in support of MHLD 
Operations – DRAFT, Draft copy of 9 May 2003 
U.S. Northern Command 
<http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.homeland> 2 
October 2003 
U.S. President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 
February 2003 
Waldman, Peter, A Historian’s Take on Islam Steers U.S. in 
Terrorism Fight, The Wall Street Journal, 2001 The 
Washington Post Company 
Wedgewood, Ruth, Self-Defense, Pirates and Contraband, Wall 
Street Journal, 29 May 2003 
Young, Eric, The U.S. Navy’s Role in Executing the Maritime 
CONOPS for U.S. Homeland Security/Defense, Naval War 
College, 13 May 2002 
 
55 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Dr Paul Stockton 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Robert Simeral 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Christopher Belavita 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. CAPT Martin Paulaitis 




7. RDML Carl Mauney 
Office of Chief of Naval Operations 
Navy Pentagon 
Washington D.C. 
